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4 次代码提交
fac6ed1853
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fc92b963d4
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fc92b963d4 | |||
9acbd5dccf | |||
87ebc137d5 | |||
67189f34c6 |
11
.gitignore
vendored
普通文件
11
.gitignore
vendored
普通文件
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.user
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.o
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*.user
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*.o
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*.a
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moc_*.cpp
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moc_*.h
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Makefile
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cli/looqs
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gui/looqs-gui
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qrc_*
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# looqs: Release notes
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## 2022-06-07 - v0.2
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CHANGES:
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- Sandboxing: Add environment variable `LOOQS_DISABLE_SANDBOXING` to disable sandboxing. This is intended for troubleshooting
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- Sandboxing: Fix issue where activation failed on kernels without landlock
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## 2022-06-06 - v0.1
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The first release comes with basic functionality. It's a start that can be considered useful to some degree.
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@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ The architecture ensures that the parsing of documents and the preview generatio
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Qt code is considered trusted in this model. While one may critize this, it was the only practical solution. looqs uses its serialization mechanism and other classes to communicate between the non-sandboxed GUI process and the sandboxed processes.
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Set the enviornment variable `LOOQS_DISABLE_SANDBOX=1` to disable sandboxing. It's intended for troublehshooting.
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## Database
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The heart is sqlite, with the FTS5 extensions behind the full-text search. I definitly did not
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want to run some heavy Java based solutions. I explored other options like Postgresql, I've discard them due to some limitations back then.
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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ There is no need to write the long form of filters. There are also booleans avai
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## Current status
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Last version: 2022-06-06, v0.1
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Last version: 2022-06-07, v0.2
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Please see [Changelog](CHANGELOG.md) for a human readable list of changes.
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21
gui/main.cpp
21
gui/main.cpp
@ -23,19 +23,23 @@ void enableIpcSandbox()
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qCritical() << "Failed to init policy for sandbox";
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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policy->namespace_options = EXILE_UNSHARE_NETWORK | EXILE_UNSHARE_USER;
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policy->namespace_options = EXILE_UNSHARE_USER | EXILE_UNSHARE_MOUNT | EXILE_UNSHARE_NETWORK;
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policy->no_new_privs = 1;
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policy->drop_caps = 1;
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policy->vow_promises =
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exile_vows_from_str("thread cpath wpath rpath unix stdio prot_exec proc shm fsnotify ioctl error");
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policy->mount_path_policies_to_chroot = 1;
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QString ipcSocketPath = Common::ipcSocketPath();
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QFileInfo info{ipcSocketPath};
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QString ipcSocketPathDir = info.absolutePath();
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std::string stdIpcSocketPath = ipcSocketPathDir.toStdString();
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exile_append_path_policies(policy, EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_READ, "/");
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exile_append_path_policies(policy, EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_READ | EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_WRITE, stdIpcSocketPath.c_str());
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/* ALLOW_EXEC is needed for fallback, not in landlock mode. It does not allow executing anything though here
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* due to the vows */
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exile_append_path_policies(policy, EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_READ | EXILE_FS_ALLOW_EXEC, "/");
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exile_append_path_policies(policy, EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_READ | EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_WRITE | EXILE_FS_ALLOW_EXEC,
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stdIpcSocketPath.c_str());
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int ret = exile_enable_policy(policy);
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if(ret != 0)
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{
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@ -54,14 +58,21 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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if(arg == "ipc")
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{
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Common::setupAppInfo();
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enableIpcSandbox();
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if(Common::noSandboxModeRequested())
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{
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qInfo() << "Launching with no sandbox!" << Qt::endl;
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}
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else
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{
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enableIpcSandbox();
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}
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QApplication a(argc, argv);
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IpcServer *ipcserver = new IpcServer();
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qDebug() << "Launching IPC Server";
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if(!ipcserver->startSpawner(socketPath))
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{
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qCritical() << "Error failed to spawn";
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qCritical() << "Error failed to spawn" << Qt::endl;
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return 1;
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}
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qDebug() << "Launched IPC Server";
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@ -157,6 +157,16 @@ QString Common::databasePath()
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return env;
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}
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bool Common::noSandboxModeRequested()
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{
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QString env = getenv("LOOQS_DISABLE_SANDBOX");
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if(env == "1")
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{
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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QString Common::ipcSocketPath()
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{
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return "/tmp/.looqs/looqs-ipc-socket";
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@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ QStringList excludedPaths();
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QStringList mountPaths();
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bool isTextFile(QFileInfo fileInfo);
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bool isMountPath(QString path);
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bool noSandboxModeRequested();
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QString versionText();
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} // namespace Common
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#endif
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@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ static QMap<QString, Processor *> processors{
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void SandboxedProcessor::enableSandbox(QString readablePath)
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{
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if(Common::noSandboxModeRequested())
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{
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qInfo() << "Sandbox is disabled!" << Qt::endl;
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return;
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}
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struct exile_policy *policy = exile_init_policy();
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if(policy == NULL)
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{
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