Salīdzināt revīzijas

..

Nav kopīgu revīziju. Atzariem "e76988ee7779dcdd6e99be030b2d311fe7dbc508" un "87ebc137d54164a3d5fdf05f19770bf802f74179" ir pilnībā atšķirīga izmaiņu vēsture.

6 mainīti faili ar 7 papildinājumiem un 47 dzēšanām

11
.gitignore ārējs
Parādīt failu

@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
.user
.o
*.user
*.o
*.a
moc_*.cpp
moc_*.h
Makefile
cli/looqs
gui/looqs-gui
qrc_*

Parādīt failu

@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
# looqs: Release notes
## 2022-06-07 - v0.2
CHANGES:
- Sandboxing: Add environment variable `LOOQS_DISABLE_SANDBOXING` to disable sandboxing. This is intended for troubleshooting
- Sandboxing: Fix issue where activation failed on kernels without landlock
## 2022-06-06 - v0.1
The first release comes with basic functionality. It's a start that can be considered useful to some degree.

Parādīt failu

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ There is no need to write the long form of filters. There are also booleans avai
## Current status
Last version: 2022-06-07, v0.2
Last version: 2022-06-06, v0.1
Please see [Changelog](CHANGELOG.md) for a human readable list of changes.

Parādīt failu

@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ void enableIpcSandbox()
policy->namespace_options = EXILE_UNSHARE_USER | EXILE_UNSHARE_MOUNT | EXILE_UNSHARE_NETWORK;
policy->no_new_privs = 1;
policy->drop_caps = 1;
policy->vow_promises = exile_vows_from_str("thread cpath rpath unix stdio proc error");
policy->vow_promises =
exile_vows_from_str("thread cpath wpath rpath unix stdio prot_exec proc shm fsnotify ioctl error");
policy->mount_path_policies_to_chroot = 1;
QString ipcSocketPath = Common::ipcSocketPath();
@ -34,12 +35,6 @@ void enableIpcSandbox()
QString ipcSocketPathDir = info.absolutePath();
std::string stdIpcSocketPath = ipcSocketPathDir.toStdString();
/* we only need the 'server' side of the 'unix' vow (for unix sockets)'. The process
* has no business to connect anywhere.
*
* Maybe this case should be handled by exile at some point, but for now deal with it here */
exile_append_syscall_policy(policy, EXILE_SYS(connect), EXILE_SYSCALL_DENY_RET_ERROR, NULL, 0);
/* ALLOW_EXEC is needed for fallback, not in landlock mode. It does not allow executing anything though here
* due to the vows */
exile_append_path_policies(policy, EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_READ | EXILE_FS_ALLOW_EXEC, "/");
@ -48,26 +43,9 @@ void enableIpcSandbox()
int ret = exile_enable_policy(policy);
if(ret != 0)
{
qDebug() << "Failed to establish sandbox" << Qt::endl;
qDebug() << "Failed to establish sandbox";
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* Arguments are irrelevant for sandbox test, just want to silence analyzer/compiler warnings */
ret = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if(ret != -1 || errno != EACCES)
{
qCritical() << "Sandbox sanity check failed" << Qt::endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
const struct sockaddr *addr = {};
ret = connect(3, addr, sizeof(*addr));
if(ret != -1 || errno != EACCES)
{
qCritical() << "Sandbox sanity check failed" << Qt::endl;
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
exile_free_policy(policy);
}
@ -88,7 +66,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
enableIpcSandbox();
}
QCoreApplication a(argc, argv);
QApplication a(argc, argv);
IpcServer *ipcserver = new IpcServer();
qDebug() << "Launching IPC Server";

Parādīt failu

@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ void SandboxedProcessor::enableSandbox(QString readablePath)
struct exile_policy *policy = exile_init_policy();
if(policy == NULL)
{
qCritical() << "Could not init exile" << Qt::endl;
qCritical() << "Could not init exile";
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
policy->namespace_options = EXILE_UNSHARE_NETWORK | EXILE_UNSHARE_USER;
@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ void SandboxedProcessor::enableSandbox(QString readablePath)
std::string readablePathLocation;
if(!readablePath.isEmpty())
{
policy->namespace_options |= EXILE_UNSHARE_MOUNT;
policy->mount_path_policies_to_chroot = 1;
readablePathLocation = readablePath.toStdString();
if(exile_append_path_policies(policy, EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_READ, readablePathLocation.c_str()) != 0)
{

@ -1 +1 @@
Subproject commit 8f38dc4480d51e2bf737ef87dd4a4f408d90a8a6
Subproject commit 42d44b0cc1e4ef35d0429e43a1dd005556450b44