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5 次程式碼提交
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e76988ee77
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11
.gitignore
vendored
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11
.gitignore
vendored
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
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.user
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.o
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*.user
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*.o
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*.a
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moc_*.cpp
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moc_*.h
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Makefile
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cli/looqs
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gui/looqs-gui
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qrc_*
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@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
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# looqs: Release notes
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## 2022-06-07 - v0.2
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CHANGES:
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- Sandboxing: Add environment variable `LOOQS_DISABLE_SANDBOXING` to disable sandboxing. This is intended for troubleshooting
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- Sandboxing: Fix issue where activation failed on kernels without landlock
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## 2022-06-06 - v0.1
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The first release comes with basic functionality. It's a start that can be considered useful to some degree.
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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ There is no need to write the long form of filters. There are also booleans avai
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## Current status
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Last version: 2022-06-06, v0.1
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Last version: 2022-06-07, v0.2
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Please see [Changelog](CHANGELOG.md) for a human readable list of changes.
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30
gui/main.cpp
30
gui/main.cpp
@ -26,8 +26,7 @@ void enableIpcSandbox()
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policy->namespace_options = EXILE_UNSHARE_USER | EXILE_UNSHARE_MOUNT | EXILE_UNSHARE_NETWORK;
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policy->no_new_privs = 1;
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policy->drop_caps = 1;
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policy->vow_promises =
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exile_vows_from_str("thread cpath wpath rpath unix stdio prot_exec proc shm fsnotify ioctl error");
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policy->vow_promises = exile_vows_from_str("thread cpath rpath unix stdio proc error");
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policy->mount_path_policies_to_chroot = 1;
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QString ipcSocketPath = Common::ipcSocketPath();
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@ -35,6 +34,12 @@ void enableIpcSandbox()
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QString ipcSocketPathDir = info.absolutePath();
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std::string stdIpcSocketPath = ipcSocketPathDir.toStdString();
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/* we only need the 'server' side of the 'unix' vow (for unix sockets)'. The process
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* has no business to connect anywhere.
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*
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* Maybe this case should be handled by exile at some point, but for now deal with it here */
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exile_append_syscall_policy(policy, EXILE_SYS(connect), EXILE_SYSCALL_DENY_RET_ERROR, NULL, 0);
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/* ALLOW_EXEC is needed for fallback, not in landlock mode. It does not allow executing anything though here
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* due to the vows */
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exile_append_path_policies(policy, EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_READ | EXILE_FS_ALLOW_EXEC, "/");
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@ -43,9 +48,26 @@ void enableIpcSandbox()
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int ret = exile_enable_policy(policy);
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if(ret != 0)
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{
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qDebug() << "Failed to establish sandbox";
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qDebug() << "Failed to establish sandbox" << Qt::endl;
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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/* Arguments are irrelevant for sandbox test, just want to silence analyzer/compiler warnings */
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ret = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
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if(ret != -1 || errno != EACCES)
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{
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qCritical() << "Sandbox sanity check failed" << Qt::endl;
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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const struct sockaddr *addr = {};
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ret = connect(3, addr, sizeof(*addr));
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if(ret != -1 || errno != EACCES)
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{
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qCritical() << "Sandbox sanity check failed" << Qt::endl;
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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exile_free_policy(policy);
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}
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@ -66,7 +88,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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{
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enableIpcSandbox();
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}
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QApplication a(argc, argv);
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QCoreApplication a(argc, argv);
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IpcServer *ipcserver = new IpcServer();
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qDebug() << "Launching IPC Server";
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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ void SandboxedProcessor::enableSandbox(QString readablePath)
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struct exile_policy *policy = exile_init_policy();
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if(policy == NULL)
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{
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qCritical() << "Could not init exile";
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qCritical() << "Could not init exile" << Qt::endl;
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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policy->namespace_options = EXILE_UNSHARE_NETWORK | EXILE_UNSHARE_USER;
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@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ void SandboxedProcessor::enableSandbox(QString readablePath)
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std::string readablePathLocation;
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if(!readablePath.isEmpty())
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{
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policy->namespace_options |= EXILE_UNSHARE_MOUNT;
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policy->mount_path_policies_to_chroot = 1;
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readablePathLocation = readablePath.toStdString();
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if(exile_append_path_policies(policy, EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_READ, readablePathLocation.c_str()) != 0)
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{
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@ -1 +1 @@
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Subproject commit 42d44b0cc1e4ef35d0429e43a1dd005556450b44
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Subproject commit 8f38dc4480d51e2bf737ef87dd4a4f408d90a8a6
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