Gráfico de commits

121 Commits

Autor SHA1 Mensagem Data
0a4e4850f9 Introduce exile_vows_from_str() 2022-01-17 22:42:26 +01:00
4a3ac8e0bc exile_launch(): Improve handling/logging of errors 2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
ed54575b89 exile_launch(): Open another pipe to also write to child 2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
0caff45600 EXILE_LOG_ERROR: Prepend function name 2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
080c0e53c2 test: test_mkpath(): Cleanup before run and on success 2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
4adc13215b exile_append_path_policies(): Add sentinel macro, making *policy() version redundant 2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
bf29edf213 Update README with most recent draft 2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
68bfd7e66c Update copyright header 2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
58bc50db61 test: Begin testing exile_launch*() 2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
1e63fa75ef Introduce exile_launch*(): Simplifies launching functions protected by policy
Those functions clone(), then activate the specified policy.
They then jump to the supplied function and pass an argument to it.

exile_launch() returns a read file descriptor, that can be
used by the parent process to get the data.

exile_launch_get() is a convenience wrapper, return a buffer
containing everything read from the sandboxed function.
2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
6c44c88397 create_chroot_dirs(): Correct comment 2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
3780509078 Introduce flags indicating errors to catch non-checked return codes
Certain functions can fail before we execute exile_enable_policy().

While the return code should be checked, it's easily forgotten. For
most users, checking just the exile_enable_policy() return code
should suffice.

exile_append_path_policies(): Add check whether a path exists. If not,
set the error flag.

This also allows an early exit, allowing to cleanly handle the case
when a path does not exist. Previously, this was only caught
during activation, and a failure there is generally undefined.
2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
fd4dfb12f0 vow: Add prlimit64(),arch_prctl() 2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
a9e6b3ee67 chroot: Create all paths first, then mount
We mounted after creating dirs, this was potentially problematic
for the next path policy to follow.

Perform two passes on the path_policies list, first creates all
dirs, second does the mounts.
2022-01-16 21:46:11 +01:00
3b61e90761 test: Add mkpath() test 2022-01-16 20:38:03 +01:00
0e27b19999 Handle files for bind-mounts too, rename mkdir_structure() to mkpath() 2022-01-16 20:38:03 +01:00
ff70142e04 exile_flags_to_landlock(): Only add flags for a path that a reasonable 2022-01-08 12:19:31 +01:00
4824c6eaa9 check_policy_sanity(): Traverse path_policy list only if no landlock available 2021-12-29 11:03:51 +01:00
9048a3b4fe append_syscall_to_bpf(): Improve readability 2021-12-29 11:03:51 +01:00
0b54e73ff4 Rework get_vow_argfilter() for readability and easiness
The previous approach had too many special cases, was quite
error-prone when changing things and a bit messy in general.
2021-12-29 11:03:51 +01:00
b2306299d5 vow: fix clone filter broken by ca0f8279 2021-12-28 13:17:20 +01:00
55b43fdaac Rename our 'pledge' mechanism to 'vow'
Among other differences, pledge() from OpenBSD takes a string
and has exec promises. We don't.

Using the same name yet providing a different interface does not
appear reasonable.
2021-12-28 11:05:24 +01:00
6420ca1b40 Add landlock runtime detection
We cannot assume that landlock is enabled if we can compile it.
Even if it's enabled in the kernel it may still not be loaded.

We fill fallback to chroot/bind-mounts if we can.

If we can't (because path policies have landlock-specific options),
we can't do that either.

Closes: #21
2021-12-27 16:51:08 +01:00
98c76089de Handle new 5.16 syscall: futex_waitv 2021-12-27 14:26:37 +01:00
631980b775 Include linux/capability.h instead of sys/capability.h
Some distros put sys/capability.h into libcap-dev or
similiar, which is a bit unforunate, we don't need
libcap-dev or anything like that.

Since we anyway only used the capget()/capset(), we can
just define a simple wrapper and call the syscall directly
and therefore avoid above mentioned issue.
2021-12-27 14:15:50 +01:00
0be081c55d Merge get_pledge_argfilter() with get_pledge_argfilter() 2021-12-27 14:11:58 +01:00
ca0f82790c Use some macros to increase readabiltiy of BPF rules 2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
77adf09d34 test: Add tests for exile_pledge() 2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
bcab0377f1 Add exile_pledge(): A convenience wrapper
exile_pledge() adds seccomp filters derived from the
promises.
2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
b469a82eec pledge: Allow NO_NEW_PRIVS prctls
Retreiving it does no harm. It cannot be unset once set, thus
no harm in allowing to set it either.
2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
6711b394d9 pledge: Add EXILE_SYSCALL_PLEDGE_SECCOMP_INSTALL to allow adding further seccomp filters 2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
9abbc7510c Introduce exile_create_policy(): Creates an clean/empty policy.
exile_create_policy() Creates an empty policy that can be
used by the exile.h API.

exile_init_policy() sets opinionated default values.
2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
029762e894 pledge: Add EXILE_SYSCALL_PLEDGE_IOCTL to allow ioctl() without argfilters 2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
6b513f8339 pledge: Add prctl() default filter 2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
d2357ac676 pledge: Introduce clone() filter and EXILE_SYSCALL_PLEDGE_THREAD 2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
0b0dda0de1 pledge: Begin filter for setsockopt() args 2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
7115ef8b4d Begin an pledge()-like implementation
This begins a pledge() implementation. This also
retires the previous syscall grouping approach,
as pledge() is the superior mechanism.

Squashed:
test: Begin basic pledge test
pledge: Begin EXILE_SYSCALL_PLEDGE_UNIX/EXILE_SYSCALL_PLEDGE_INET
test: Add pledge socket test
Introduce EXILE_SYSCALL_PLEDGE_DENY_ERROR, remove exile_policy->pledge_policy
pledge: Add PROT_EXEC
2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
15a6850023 Begin low-level seccomp arg filter interface
Squashed:
test: Adjust existing to new API with arg filters
test: Add tests for low-level seccomp args filter API
test: Add seccomp_filter_mixed()
test: Switch to syscall() everywhere
append_syscall_to_bpf(): Apply EXILE_SYSCALL_EXIT_BPF_NO_MATCH also for sock_filter.jt
2021-12-27 12:35:54 +01:00
48deab0dde exile_enable_policy(): Only chdir() post chroot() 2021-12-27 12:35:35 +01:00
ce7eb57998 enter_namespaces(): Fix error message 2021-12-27 12:35:35 +01:00
3407fded04 Add EXILE_FS_ALLOW_ALL_{READ,WRITE}
Issue: #19
2021-12-27 00:30:52 +01:00
1b4c5477a5 rename to exile.h
qssb.h was a preliminary name and can't be pronounced smoothly.

exile.h is more fitting and it's also short. Something exiled is essentially
something isolated, which is pretty much what this library does (isolation from
resources such as file system, network and others accessible by system calls).
2021-11-30 18:19:15 +01:00
756b0fb421 rename qssb.h to exile.h 2021-11-30 17:40:36 +01:00
d150c2ecd9 Don't add any seccomp rules by default
Cannot be done properly on a pure syscall basis at this point.

A whitelist is almost certainly too restrictive, which means user
has to manually adjust the policy anyway. Then the default is not
of much use. Or too permissive.

A blacklist has to play catchup with new kernel versions. This may
be be improved upon by blocking all unknown (too new) syscall
numbers. However, in light of the fact we drop caps and set no_new_privs,
it's debtable how much we can gain from a blacklist anyway.

So best to leave it to the user. We also need to allow checking args
too in order to make it easier to build policies. Perhaps get
inspiration from pledge() in OpenBSD.
2021-11-20 20:54:28 +01:00
435bcefa48 test: Skip landlock specific tests if unavailble during compile time 2021-11-20 19:25:30 +01:00
2a4cee2ece test: Use xqssb_enable_policy() throughout where reasonable 2021-11-20 16:56:19 +01:00
d847d0f996 qssb_append_group_syscall_policy(): Make QSSB_SYSCGROUP_NONE an invalid group 2021-11-14 21:46:47 +01:00
1a2443db18 qssb_append_syscalls_policy(): Fix mem leak on failure 2021-11-14 21:46:47 +01:00
db17e58deb Assign syscalls into groups. Add whitelist mode (default).
Classify syscalls into groups, for x86_64 only for now.
Up to date for 5.15, generate some #ifndef for syscalls
introduced since 5.10. Only support x86_64 therefore at this point.

Switch from blacklisting to a default whitelist.
2021-11-14 21:46:47 +01:00
0d7c5bd6d4 append_syscall_to_bpf(): Explicit type cast to fix (C++) warnings 2021-10-25 18:18:31 +02:00