Initial commit

This commit is contained in:
Albert S. 2019-10-13 17:57:12 +02:00
commit 200cd7878c
2 changed files with 443 additions and 0 deletions

42
README.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
qssb (quite simple sandbox)
===========================
qssb.h is a simple header only library for easy sandboxing of
applications.
It aims to provide an interface to avoid the annoying details that
using Seccomp and Linux Namespaces requires.
Features
========
Systemcall filtering, restricting file system access, dropping
privileges, isolating the application from the network, etc.
Requirements
============
Kernel x.y.z.
Status
======
No release yet, API is unstable.
Documentation
=============
To be written
Examples
========
Real world project: cgit sandboxed: https://git.quitesimple.org/cgitsb
Contributing
============
Contributations are very welcome. Options:
1) Pull-Request: github.com/quitesimpleorg/qssb
2) Mail to qssb at quitesimple.org with instructions
on where to pull the changes.
3) Mailing a classic patch.
License
=======
ISC

401
qssb.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
#ifndef QSSB_H
#define QSSB_H
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#include <stddef.h>
//TODO: stolen from kernel samples/seccomp, GPLv2...?
#define ALLOW \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
#define DENY \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL)
#define SYSCALL(nr, jt) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (nr), 0, 1), jt
#define LOAD_SYSCALL_NR \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
#define QSSB_ISOLATE_NETWORK 1<<1
#define QSSB_LOG_ERROR(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__)
/* Policy tells qssb what to do */
struct qssb_policy
{
int drop_caps;
int preserve_cwd;
int not_dumpable;
int no_new_privs;
int namespace_options;
int syscall_default_policy;
int *blacklisted_syscalls;
int *allowed_syscalls;
char *chroot_target_path;
char *chdir_path;
char **readonly_paths;
char **writable_paths;
};
/* Creates the default policy
* Must be freed using qssb_free_policy
* @returns: default policy */
struct qssb_policy *qssb_init_policy()
{
struct qssb_policy *result = calloc(1, sizeof(struct qssb_policy));
result->drop_caps = 1;
result->not_dumpable = 1;
result->no_new_privs = 1;
result->namespace_options = 0;
result->chdir_path = "/";
result->chroot_target_path = NULL;
result->readonly_paths = NULL;
result->writable_paths = NULL;
return result;
}
/* Creates a directory and all necessary parent directories
*
* @returns: 0 on success, -ERRNO on failure
* */
static int mkdir_structure(const char *p, mode_t mode)
{
char path[PATH_MAX + 2] = { 0 };
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/", p);
char *begin = path;
char *end = begin+1;
while(*end)
{
if(*end == '/')
{
*end = 0;
if(mkdir(begin, mode) < 0)
{
if(errno == EEXIST)
{
//TODO: stat, test if it is a directory, if not, err
}
else
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("Failed to create directory for chroot: %s\n", begin);
return -1;
}
}
*end = '/';
++end;
while(*end == '/')
{
++end;
}
}
else
{
++end;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Helper to mount directories into the chroot path "chroot_target_path"
* Paths will be created if necessary
* @returns: 0 on sucess, -ERRNO on failure */
static int mount_to_chroot(const char *chroot_target_path, char **paths, unsigned long flags)
{
if(paths == NULL)
{
return 0;
}
char *path = *paths;
while(path != NULL)
{
char path_inside_chroot[PATH_MAX + 1];
snprintf(path_inside_chroot, sizeof(path_inside_chroot), "%s/%s", chroot_target_path, path);
int ret = mkdir_structure(path_inside_chroot, 0700);
if(ret < 0)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("Error creating directory structure while mounting paths to chroot. %s\n", strerror(errno));
return ret;
}
ret = mount(path, path_inside_chroot, NULL, flags, NULL);
if(ret < 0 )
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("Error: Failed to mount %s to %s: %s\n", path, path_inside_chroot, strerror(errno));
return ret;
}
path = *(++paths);
}
return 0;
}
/* Ends the policy as best as possible. */
/* TODO: can this function do actually anything useful?*/
static int qssb_end_policy(struct qssb_policy *ctxt)
{
}
/*
* Frees the memory taken by a qssb_policy object
*/
static void qssb_free_policy(struct qssb_policy *ctxt)
{
free(ctxt);
}
/* Enters the user and mount namespaces */
static int enter_namespaces()
{
int ret = unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER);
if(ret == -1)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("Error: Failed to unshare user namespaces: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return ret;
}
uid_t current_uid = getuid();
gid_t current_gid = getgid();
//TODO: check errors
FILE *fp = fopen("/proc/self/setgroups", "w");
fprintf(fp, "deny");
fclose(fp);
fp = fopen("/proc/self/uid_map", "w");
fprintf(fp, "0 %i", current_uid);
fclose(fp);
fp = fopen("/proc/self/gid_map", "w");
fprintf(fp, "0 %i", current_gid);
fclose(fp);
ret = unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
if(ret == -1)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("Error: Failed to unshare mount namespaces: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
/* Drops all capabiltiies held by the process
*
* @returns: 0 on sucess, -1 on error
*/
static int drop_caps()
{
int cap = 0;
int res = 0;
while((res = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, cap, 0, 0, 0)) == 0)
{
++cap;
}
if(res == -1 && errno != EINVAL)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("Failed to drop the capability bounding set!");
return -errno;
}
//TODO: systems that are not 64 bit
struct __user_cap_header_struct h = { 0 };
h.pid = 0;
h.version = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3;
struct __user_cap_data_struct drop[2];
drop[0].effective = 0;
drop[0].permitted = 0;
drop[0].inheritable = 0;
drop[1].effective = 0;
drop[1].permitted = 0;
drop[1].inheritable = 0;
if(capset(&h, drop) == -1)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("Failed to drop capabilities: %s\n", strerror(errno));;
return -errno;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Enables the per_syscall seccomp action for system calls
*
* syscalls: array of system calls numbers. -1 must be the last entry.
* per_syscall: action to apply for each system call
* default_action: the default action at the end
*
* @returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
*/
static int seccomp_enable(int *syscalls, int per_syscall, int default_action)
{
struct sock_filter filter[1024] =
{
LOAD_SYSCALL_NR,
};
int current_filter_index = 1;
while(*syscalls != -1)
{
struct sock_filter syscall = BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, *syscalls, 0, 1);
struct sock_filter action = BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, per_syscall);
filter[current_filter_index++] = syscall;
filter[current_filter_index++] = action;
++syscalls;
}
struct sock_filter da = BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
filter[current_filter_index] = da;
struct sock_fprog prog = {
.len = current_filter_index + 1,
.filter = filter,
};
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) == -1)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("prctl SET_SECCOMP %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Blacklists the specified systemcalls.
*
* syscalls: array of system calls numbers. -1 must be the last entry.
*/
static int seccomp_enable_blacklist(int *syscalls)
{
return seccomp_enable(syscalls, SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
}
/*
* Blacklists the specified systemcalls.
*
* syscalls: array of system calls numbers. -1 must be the last entry.
*/
static int seccomp_enable_whitelist(int *syscalls)
{
return seccomp_enable(syscalls, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
}
/* Enables the specified qssb_policy.
*
* The calling process is supposed *TO BE WRITTEN* if
* this function fails.
* @returns: 0 on sucess, <0 on error
*/
int qssb_enable_policy(struct qssb_policy *policy)
{
if(policy->blacklisted_syscalls != NULL && policy->allowed_syscalls != NULL)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("Error: Cannot mix blacklisted and whitelisted systemcalls\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(policy->chroot_target_path == NULL)
{
policy->chroot_target_path = "/tmp/.TODOIMPLEMENT"; //TODO: implement
}
if(enter_namespaces() < 0)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("Error while trying to enter namespaces\n");
return -1;
}
if(policy->readonly_paths != NULL || policy->writable_paths != NULL)
{
if(mount_to_chroot(policy->chroot_target_path, policy->readonly_paths, MS_BIND | MS_RDONLY) < 0)
{
return -1;
}
if(mount_to_chroot(policy->chroot_target_path, policy->writable_paths, MS_BIND) < 0)
{
return -1;
}
if(chroot(policy->chroot_target_path) < 0)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("chroot: failed to enter %s\n", policy->chroot_target_path);
return -1;
}
}
if(chdir(policy->chdir_path) < 0)
{
return -1;
}
if(policy->drop_caps)
{
drop_caps();
}
if(policy->not_dumpable)
{
if(prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) == -1)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("prctl: PR_SET_DUMPABLE failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
if(policy->no_new_privs)
{
if(prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("prctl: PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
}
if(policy->allowed_syscalls != NULL)
{
if(seccomp_enable_whitelist(policy->allowed_syscalls) <0)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("seccomp_enable_whitelist failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
if(policy->blacklisted_syscalls != NULL)
{
if(seccomp_enable_blacklist(policy->blacklisted_syscalls) <0)
{
QSSB_LOG_ERROR("seccomp_enable_blacklist failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
#endif