qswiki/sandbox/sandbox-linux.cpp

139 sor
4.0 KiB
C++

#include <vector>
#include <initializer_list>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fstream>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <filesystem>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#include <qssb.h>
#include "../logger.h"
#include "../utils.h"
#include "../random.h"
#include "sandbox-linux.h"
/* TODO: make a whitelist approach. So far we simply blacklist
* obvious systemcalls. To whitelist, we need to analyse our
* dependencies (http library, sqlite wrapper, sqlite lib etc.) */
bool SandboxLinux::enableForInit()
{
umask(0027);
struct qssb_policy *policy = qssb_init_policy();
if(policy == NULL)
{
Logger::error() << "Failed to init sandboxing policy (init)";
return false;
}
policy->namespace_options = QSSB_UNSHARE_USER;
policy->drop_caps = 0;
qssb_append_syscall_policy(policy, QSSB_SYSCALL_DENY_KILL_PROCESS, QSSB_SYS(execveat));
qssb_append_syscall_policy(policy, QSSB_SYSCALL_DENY_KILL_PROCESS, QSSB_SYS(execve));
qssb_append_syscall_default_policy(policy, QSSB_SYSCALL_ALLOW);
int result = qssb_enable_policy(policy);
if(result != 0)
{
Logger::error() << "Failed to enable sandboxing policy (init): " << result;
qssb_free_policy(policy);
return false;
}
qssb_free_policy(policy);
return true;
}
bool SandboxLinux::enablePreWorker(std::vector<std::string> fsPaths)
{
std::sort(fsPaths.begin(), fsPaths.end(),
[](const std::string &a, const std::string &b) { return a.length() < b.length(); });
struct qssb_policy *policy = qssb_init_policy();
if(policy == NULL)
{
Logger::error() << "Failed to init sandboxing policy (pre)";
return false;
}
for(unsigned int i = 0; i < fsPaths.size(); i++)
{
qssb_append_path_policy(policy, QSSB_FS_ALLOW_READ | QSSB_FS_ALLOW_WRITE, fsPaths[i].c_str());
}
policy->namespace_options = QSSB_UNSHARE_MOUNT;
policy->drop_caps = 0;
policy->mount_path_policies_to_chroot = 1;
qssb_append_syscall_policy(policy, QSSB_SYSCALL_DENY_KILL_PROCESS, QSSB_SYS(execveat));
qssb_append_syscall_policy(policy, QSSB_SYSCALL_DENY_KILL_PROCESS, QSSB_SYS(execve));
qssb_append_syscall_default_policy(policy, QSSB_SYSCALL_ALLOW);
int result = qssb_enable_policy(policy);
if(result != 0)
{
Logger::error() << "Failed to install sandboxing policy (preworker): %i" << result;
qssb_free_policy(policy);
return false;
}
qssb_free_policy(policy);
return true;
}
bool SandboxLinux::supported()
{
std::fstream stream;
stream.open("/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone");
if(stream.is_open())
{
std::string str;
stream >> str;
if(str[0] == '0')
{
Logger::error() << "Please write '1' to /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone in order to enable "
"sandboxing support on this system";
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
bool SandboxLinux::enableForWorker()
{
struct qssb_policy *policy = qssb_init_policy();
if(policy == NULL)
{
Logger::error() << "Failed to init sandboxing policy (worker) ";
return false;
}
policy->drop_caps = 1;
policy->not_dumpable = 1;
policy->no_new_privs = 1;
policy->namespace_options = 0;
/* TODO: as said, a whitelist approach is better. As such, this list is bound to be incomplete in the
* sense that more could be listed here and some critical ones are probably missing */
/* TODO: use qssb groups */
long blacklisted_syscalls[] = {QSSB_SYS(setuid), QSSB_SYS(connect), QSSB_SYS(chroot), QSSB_SYS(pivot_root),
QSSB_SYS(mount), QSSB_SYS(setns), QSSB_SYS(unshare), QSSB_SYS(ptrace),
QSSB_SYS(personality), QSSB_SYS(prctl)};
qssb_append_syscalls_policy(policy, QSSB_SYSCALL_DENY_KILL_PROCESS, blacklisted_syscalls,
sizeof(blacklisted_syscalls) / sizeof(blacklisted_syscalls[0]));
qssb_append_syscall_default_policy(policy, QSSB_SYSCALL_ALLOW);
if(qssb_enable_policy(policy) != 0)
{
Logger::error() << "Sandbox: Activation of seccomp blacklist failed!";
qssb_free_policy(policy);
return false;
}
qssb_free_policy(policy);
return true;
}