#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <seccomp.h>
#include <vector>
#include <initializer_list>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fstream>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <filesystem>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#include "../logger.h"
#include "../utils.h"
#include "../random.h"

#include "sandbox-linux.h"

/* TODO: make a whitelist approach. So far we simply blacklist
 * obvious systemcalls. To whitelist, we need to analyse our
 * dependencies (http library, sqlite wrapper, sqlite lib etc.) */

/* TODO: cleanup our sandboxing directory (unmount and delete folders) after exit */
bool SandboxLinux::seccomp_blacklist(std::initializer_list<int> syscalls)
{
	scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
	ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
	if(ctx == NULL)
	{
		Logger::error() << "failed to init seccomp_init";
		return false;
	}

	for(auto sc : syscalls)
	{
		if(seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS, sc, 0) < 0)
		{
			Logger::error() << "Failed to add a seccomp rule";
			return false;
		}
	}

	bool success = seccomp_load(ctx) == 0;
	if(!success)
	{
		Logger::error() << "Failed to load seccomp filter";
		return false;
	}
	return success;
}

bool SandboxLinux::bindMountPaths(std::string target_root, std::initializer_list<std::string> paths)
{
	for(const std::string &path : paths)
	{
		std::string chroot_target_path = target_root + path;
		if(std::filesystem::exists(chroot_target_path))
		{
			continue;
		}
		if(std::filesystem::is_regular_file(path))
		{
			std::fstream f1;
			f1.open(chroot_target_path, std::ios::out);
			f1.close();
		}
		else {
			std::error_code ec;
			//TODO: fails if the stuff already exists, but it shouldn't according to doc?
			if(!std::filesystem::create_directories(chroot_target_path, ec))
			{
				Logger::error() << "Error while trying to duplicate structure for sandbox. Dir creation failed. Path: " << chroot_target_path << " Error: " << ec.message();
				return false;
			}

			if(mount(path.c_str(), chroot_target_path.c_str(), NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) == -1)
			{
				Logger::error() << "Bind mount failed! " << strerror(errno);
				return false;
			}
		}

	}
	return true;
}

bool SandboxLinux::isolateNamespaces(std::vector<std::string> fsPaths)
{
	std::sort(fsPaths.begin(), fsPaths.end(), [](const std::string &a, const std::string &b){ return a.length() < b.length(); });

	auto current_uid = getuid();
	auto current_gid = getgid();
	if(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) == -1)
	{
		Logger::error() << "Failed to unshare user namespace: " << strerror(errno);
		return false;
	}

	std::fstream setgroups;
	setgroups.open("/proc/self/setgroups", std::ios::out | std::ios::app);
	setgroups << "deny";
	setgroups.flush();
	setgroups.close();

	std::fstream uid_map;
	uid_map.open("/proc/self/uid_map", std::ios::out | std::ios::app);
	uid_map << "0 " << current_uid << " 1\n";
	uid_map.flush();
	uid_map.close();

	std::fstream gid_map;
	gid_map.open("/proc/self/gid_map", std::ios::out);
	uid_map << "0 " << current_gid << " 1\n";
	gid_map.flush();
	gid_map.close();

	if(unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) == -1)
	{
		Logger::error() << "Failed to unshare mount namespace: " << strerror(errno);
		return false;
	}

	/*
	 * TODO: breaks server.
	 * TODO: fork?
	 * if(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) == -1)
	{
		Logger::error() << "Failed to unshare pid namespace: " << strerror(errno);
		return false;
	}*/


	//The purpose is to start with a clean sandbox dir.
	//We maybe could work with mkdirat, and check whether it exists alrady, to avoid
	//some attacks where an attacker gueses the dir, but in that case the system is already compromised
	//TODO: still, check, whether this is something we must consider here or not...
	Random random;
	std::string rootpath = "/tmp/qswiki_sandbox_" + random.getRandomHexString(10) + "/";
	if(!std::filesystem::create_directory(rootpath))
	{
		Logger::error() << "Failed to create chroot directory for sandbox";
		return false;
	}


	for(std::string &path : fsPaths)
	{
		if(!bindMountPaths(rootpath, { path }))
		{
			Logger::error() << "Bind mount for " << path << " failed!";
			return false;
		}

	}

	if(chroot(rootpath.c_str()) == -1)
	{
		Logger::error() << "chroot to sandbox failed!";
		return false;
	}
	if(chdir("/") == -1)
	{
		Logger::error() << "chdir to sandbox failed!";
		return false;
	}

	return true;
}

bool SandboxLinux::enableForInit()
{
	umask(0027);

	//TODO. there is execv for SPARC. Sigh... 
	if(!seccomp_blacklist({ SCMP_SYS(execveat), SCMP_SYS(execve) }))
	{
		Logger::error() << "Failed to install blacklisting seccomp filter";
		return false;
	}

	return true;


}

bool SandboxLinux::enablePreWorker(std::vector<std::string> fsPaths)
{
	if(!isolateNamespaces(fsPaths))
	{
		Logger::error() << "Failed to isolate namespaces";
		return false;
	}
	return true;

}

bool SandboxLinux::supported()
{
	std::fstream stream;
	stream.open("/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone");
	if(stream.is_open())
	{
		std::string str;
		stream >> str;
		if(str[0] == '0')
		{
			Logger::error() << "Please write '1' to /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone in order to enable sandboxing support on this system";
			return false;
		}
	}
	return true;
}
bool SandboxLinux::enableForWorker()
{
	int cap = 0;
	int res = 0;
	while((res = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, cap++, 0, 0, 0)) == 0);
	if(res == -1 && errno != EINVAL)
	{
		Logger::error() << "Failed to drop the capability bounding set!";
		return false;
	}

	__user_cap_header_struct h = { 0 };
	h.pid = 0;
	h.version = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3;
	__user_cap_data_struct drop[2];
	drop[0].effective = 0;
	drop[0].permitted = 0;
	drop[0].inheritable = 0;
	drop[1].effective = 0;
	drop[1].permitted = 0;
	drop[1].inheritable = 0;
	if(capset(&h, drop) == -1)
	{
		Logger::error() << "Failed to drop capabilities: " << strerror(errno);
		return false;
	}




	/* TODO: as said, a whitelist approach is better. As such, this list is bound to be incomplete in the
	 * sense that more could be listed here and some critical ones are probably missing */
	if(! seccomp_blacklist({
							SCMP_SYS(setuid),
							SCMP_SYS(setuid32),
							SCMP_SYS(connect),
							SCMP_SYS(chroot),
							SCMP_SYS(pivot_root),
							SCMP_SYS(mount),
							SCMP_SYS(setns),
							SCMP_SYS(unshare),
							SCMP_SYS(ptrace),
							SCMP_SYS(personality)

					 }))
	{
		Logger::error() << "Sandbox: Activation of seccomp blacklist failed!";
		return false;
	}
	if(prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) == -1)
	{
		Logger::error() << "prctl: PR_SET_DUMPABLE failed";
		return false;
	}
	if(prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
	{
		Logger::error() << "prctl: PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed: " << strerror(errno);
		return false;
	}

	if(! seccomp_blacklist({ SCMP_SYS(prctl) }))
	{
		Logger::error() << "Sandbox: Activation of seccomp blacklist failed!";
		return false;
	}

	return true;
}